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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
NO. 03-3353
____________
THOMAS STEELE
                                                    Appellant
v.
THE CITY OF ERIE; EDWARD J. SPAGEL, JR, CORPORAL; JOHN DOE
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-00338)
District Judge: Hon. Sean J. McLaughlin
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 8, 2004
BEFORE: SLOVITER, VAN ANTWERPEN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed : October 20, 2004)
____________
OPINION
____________
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge
Thomas Steele (hereinafter “Appellant”) brought suit against the City of Erie and
investigating officer Corporal Edward Spagel, Jr. under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  He alleged
four causes of action: (1) arrest without probable cause; (2) general failure of the City of
     1 This driver’s side rear view mirror was later determined to have come from either a
Chevrolet Cavalier or a Pontiac Sunbird, model years 1988 to 1994.
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Erie to properly train, supervise and discipline its officers; (3) various state tort claims
stemming from his arrest; and (4) failure of Corporal Spagel’s supervisors to
appropriately supervise, control and discipline him (a John Doe claim).  The District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Erie and Corporal Spagel.  Appellant now
argues only two issues on appeal: that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment when it found, as a matter of law, that probable cause existed to arrest him; and
that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment when it found that Appellant’s
plea to two summary offenses precluded his §1983 claim arising from any alleged
malicious prosecution.  We now affirm the District Court’s rulings as to both these points.
I. Factual and Procedural History
We shall briefly review the essential facts of this case.  Sometime after 1:00 a.m.
on October 9, 1999, two pedestrians were injured in a hit-and-run accident at the
intersection of West 26th Street and Cherry Street in Erie, Pennsylvania.  Corporal Spagel
was assigned as the primary investigator of this accident.
Soon after the accident, the victims of the hit-and-run stated that they were hit by
an eastbound white car they identified as possibly a Grand Am.  A black, driver’s side
rear view mirror was found at the scene.1  Spagel soon after learned that a woman,
tentatively identified by a tavern patron only as “Lisa,” had stopped at the nearby Dairy
     2 Appellant represented to Corporal Spagel that he had driven westbound that evening.
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Mart two hours after the accident and had inquired about the accident and the victims. 
The Dairy Mart clerk noticed the woman drove a white car with some damage to the
front.  Corporal Spagel was unable to discover any further information pertaining to
“Lisa.”
On November 11, 1999, Corporal Spagel learned from a Wesleyville Police officer
that Appellant had had his driver’s side rear view mirror replaced on his 1989 Chevrolet
Cavalier.  Corporal Spagel contacted Appellant, who denied hitting anyone but did
acknowledge his presence in the vicinity of 26th Street and Cherry Street at the
approximate time of the accident.2  Appellant stated he believed the mirror had been
knocked off the night of the accident by another pedestrian while Appellant had been
driving home.  Corporal Spagel also noticed other damage to the front end of Appellant’s
car during the conversation, which Appellant attributed to a deer strike occurring the
same day as the accident.
After reviewing his investigation findings, Corporal Spagel completed an affidavit
of probable cause and sought an arrest warrant for Appellant.  Nowhere in this affidavit
did Corporal Spagel mention “Lisa” or that Appellant had stated he was traveling in a
westerly direction the evening of the accident.  The warrant was issued, and Appellant
was arrested.  Appellant was charged with seven violations of the Pennsylvania Motor
     3 The Commonwealth nolle prosequied the remaining five charges.
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Vehicle Code, and pleaded no contest to two summary offenses.3
On or about October 15, 2001, Appellant filed this suit in federal District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging his four causes of action.  On the
recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court granted Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment as to all claims.
II. Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331
and 1343(a)(3) & (a)(4) and 42 U.S.C. §1983.  We now exercise jurisdiction over this
appeal of a final district court order under 28 U.S.C. §1291.  This Court’s review of the
District Court’s summary judgment order in favor of Appellees is plenary.  See Torres v.
McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 170 (3d. Cir. 1998).
III. Discussion
Probable Cause to Arrest Appellant
We first resolve Appellant’s claim that no probable cause existed to justify the
issuance of an arrest warrant.
Appellant here claims that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment
as a matter of law with regard to his §1983 claims.  While generally “the question of
5probable cause in a §1983 damage suit is one for the jury,” Montgomery v. De Simone,
159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d. Cir. 1998), a district court may conclude, as a matter of law, that
the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, reasonably would
support a finding of probable cause, and may enter summary judgment accordingly.  See
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 133 F.3d 396, 401 (3d. Cir. 1997).
It is well-established that probable cause exists where “facts and circumstances
[are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or
was committing an offense.”  Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d. Cir. 1997).  As
we have stated before, in order to succeed in challenging a warrant for want of probable
cause, a litigant in Appellant’s position must prove that a warrant was obtained by
“knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless regard for the truth, mak[ing] false
statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood” and that “such statements or
omissions are material...to a finding of probable cause.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781,
787 (3d. Cir. 2000).  Appellant does not meet this standard.
After reviewing the record and scrutinizing Corporal Spagel’s affidavit of probable
cause, we are satisfied that, as a matter of law, probable cause existed at the time he
petitioned for the arrest warrant.  At the time Corporal Spagel sought the warrant, he had
a suspect who (1) admitted to being in the vicinity of the accident at the approximate time
the accident occurred, (2) drove a car of similar make and color as that identified by the
victims, and (3) whose car was damaged in a manner consistent with the damage incurred
     4 This damage included not only damage to the automobile’s body, but also the
driver’s side rear view mirror which was left at the scene of the accident.
     5 Apparently, Corporal Spagel found no further evidence tying the phantom “Lisa” to
the accident.  When asked at deposition, Corporal Spagel considered her to be a “person
of interest,” not a suspect.
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in striking a pedestrian.4  Such evidence persuades us that the District Court was correct
to find that a prudent police officer in Corporal Spagel’s position would conclude that
there was probable cause to arrest Appellant, the only suspect under investigation at the
time.5
Appellant makes much of the facts omitted by Corporal Spagel (namely any
reference to “Lisa” or Appellant’s claimed westwardly travel direction), and summarily
concludes that this evidence is sufficiently exculpatory to counsel against a finding of
probable cause.  While this evidence may have proved useful in establishing a juror’s
reasonable doubt at trial, it is not of such quantum as to amount to a material omission on
the part of Corporal Spagel.  Nothing in our jurisprudence requires a police officer
seeking an arrest warrant to present every scintilla of information acquired during an
investigation to satisfy the standard for a finding of probable cause, as long as his
submission is made in objectively good faith.    Finally, Appellant has not presented any
evidence demonstrating that, had Corporal Spagel listed every bit of information
concerning his investigation, probable cause would have dissolved.
Therefore, it is clear to us that, as a matter of law, probable cause to arrest the
Appellant existed, and the District Court properly granted summary judgment.
7Nolo Contendere Plea Barring Recovery Under §1983
Since it has been determined that probable cause existed at the time the warrant
was issued, no §1983 action lies.  See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d at 124
(holding that, in order to prevail in a §1983 malicious prosecution claim, absence of
probable cause for initiation of proceedings must be shown).  Nevertheless, we will turn
briefly to Appellant’s assertion that the District Court incorrectly found that his plea of
nolo contendere to two summary offenses barred recovery under §1983.
In Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (3d. Cir. 2000), we held that a plaintiff claiming
malicious prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case. 
See Id. at 156.  When, as here, a prosecutor seeks a grant of nolle prosequi for charges as
part of a compromise, dismissal of those charges is not an indication of actual innocence. 
See Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 580 (3d. Cir. 1996), citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts, §660, cmt. c.  Appellant’s own testimony, given at his September 10, 2002
deposition, indicates to us that the Commonwealth’s willingness to nolle prosequi five of
the seven counts brought against him was the result of a plea bargain, not a fatal defect in
the Commonwealth’s case against him.  Cf. Haefner v. Burkey, 626 A.2d. 519, 521
(1993) (nolle prosequi of charges because of insufficient evidence).  It is unclear to us
how exactly Appellant can claim he “was successful in his challenge to the charges that
he was involved in a hit-and-run accident,” at least to the degree required to successfully
8bring a malicious prosecution claim.  Without more, the revelation that a plea agreement
has been reached does not demonstrate the actual innocence that is required under Hector. 
Therefore, we believe that the District Court properly interpreted Hilfirty and
Haefner, and that it arrived at the conclusion demanded by our holding in Hector.
           We affirm the judgment of the District Court below.
